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The Role of Central Banks in Global Austerity
TIMOTHY A. CANOVA*
The literature on austerity, by scholars and policymakers alike, has
largely downplayed the important role of central banks in designing and
implementing global austerity both before and since the 2008 financial
crisis. This article considers how and why the world's leading central
banks display an inherent bias toward austerity. As central banks have
become increasingly influenced and even captured by large private banks
and financial institutions, they have pursued policy agendas that favor
those same private interests. The structure of the U.S. Federal Reserve
suggests a central bank that has been captured by design and is rife with
inherent conflicts of interest in its governance, regulatory, and monetary
policy functions. These conflicts are often overlooked because of the myth
of central bank independence, which has rested on truncated empirical
studies and flawed readings of economic history. Yet, the myth has
legitimized the Federal Reserve's policy agenda-particularly beginning
in the 1980s when Alan Greenspan became chair of the Federal
Reserve-when deregulation, liberalization, and privatization came to
serve the private interests of Wall Street banks while creating a boom-
and-bust bubble economy. The austerity bias of central banks was also
revealed in both the academic work and monetary policy approach of Ben
Bernanke, who succeeded Greenspan as Federal Reserve chairman just
ahead of the 2008 financial collapse. Not only was the Federal Reserve's
response to crisis a reflection of the domination of Wall Street interests, it
also revealed a complete misreading of the lessons from the Great
Depression by Bernanke and other mainstream economists. The result
has been a flawed "trickle-down" response to the financial crisis, as the
Federal Reserve and other leading central banks have provided massive
subsidies to financial institutions and markets while relegating other
sectors of the economy and society to the pains of austerity. A more
balanced economic approach will require reform of central bank
governance to include representatives of a wider range of social interests
in monetary policymaking.
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INTRODUCTION
William McChesney Martin, the longest-serving Federal Reserve
Board chairman from 1951 to 1970, remarked that the job of central
bankers is to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going.1
Well before the 2008 financial crisis, central bankers were the
"gatekeepers of growth," effectively deciding on both the degree and
timing of monetary and even fiscal austerity. 2 The Federal Reserve was
intended to "lean against the wind," preventing inflation by raising
interest rates at the first signs that the economy may be starting to
overheat. According to conventional wisdom, Congress, the White
House, and appointed officials at the Department of the Treasury are
not well qualified to make these decisions because of their short-term
incentives for reelection and continuity in office. It is assumed that
politicians are much more likely to spike the punch bowl when the party
is reaching its peak. This would arguably result in a big hangover:
higher inflation and an unsustainable economic expansion would be
followed by recession and even higher unemployment rates.
The theory of central bank independence assumes that central
bankers are in the best position to decide when to take away the punch
bowl because they are disinterested, socially neutral, and not favoring
any one segment of the market or of society over others. The expansion
of central bank powers since 2008 has raised doubts about these
assumptions.
This article considers the relationship between central bank
independence and austerity. The governance structure of the U.S.
Federal Reserve System (the Fed), the world's most powerful central
bank, is dominated by private banking interests that own the shares of
the regional Federal Reserve Banks (FRBs or Fed Banks) which in turn
dominate the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Fed's
monetary policy-making arm. This structure suggests that central bank
independence is a myth, a cover for the capture of central banks by
private banking interests. What we see is pseudo-independence, a false
independence. Part I considers the captured Fed as a failure of the rule
of law that harms those lacking genuine representation on its key
* Professor of Law and Public Finance, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad College of Law.
1. William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Bd. Governors Fed. Res. Sys., Address
before the New York Group of the Investment Bankers Association of America (Oct. 19,
1955), available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/martin55_1019.pdf.
2. See SYLVIA MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37-44 (1997) (discussing the
role of central bank independence as a marker for international creditworthiness).
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boards and committees and is biased toward an austerity agenda.
Although central bank governance may be increasingly independent of
politics, it is not independent of the private banking and financial
interests that central banks are charged with regulating, supervising,
and supporting. The crisis heightened the gulf between what the
pseudo-independent central bank promises and what it delivers in
reality.
Part II considers the central banking agenda during the 1987-2006
period when Alan Greenspan chaired the Federal Reserve Board.
Significant reforms occurred during this period, including the
liberalization of finance and trade, deregulation and de-supervision of
mortgage lenders and Wall Street banks, and the emergence of a casino
economy. Greenspan and the pseudo-independent Fed played a decisive
role in shifting the U.S. economy from widely shared prosperity to a
winner-take-all society.
Greenspan left the Federal Reserve just as the housing and
mortgage markets turned soft and declined. President George W. Bush
appointed his top White House economic advisor Ben Bernanke to
replace Greenspan as Fed chairman. Bernanke, a Princeton economist
who claimed a reputation as an authority on the Great Depression of
the 1930s, soon expanded the Fed's lending and asset purchase powers
well beyond its traditional boundaries to allocation decisions that
effectively picked winners and losers in the financial marketplace. This
expansion raised questions about the Fed's purported social neutrality
and the justifications for its political independence from the
representative branches of government. Not only was the Fed's response
a reflection of the domination of private financial interests, the response
also revealed a complete misreading of the Great Depression by
Bernanke and other mainstream economists. Part III analyzes the flaws
in Bernanke's understanding of the Great Depression; Part IV analyzes
flaws in his trickle-down monetary policy as Fed chairman, which has
contributed to austerity. The arguments for austerity are tenuous and
the evidence is thin. As Mark Blyth points out, austerity policies
worsened the Great Depression in the 1930s and have more recently
worsened the economic depression in Greece. Governments have been
punished for the enormous increases in shaky private debt, made
possible by central banks and private banking clienteles.3 When the
markets crashed, much of the private "toxic" debt was simply
rechristened as government debt, and governments were placed in
austerity programs under central bank supervision.
3. MARK BLYTH. AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA 47 (2013).
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This article concludes by offering a review of the forgotten lessons of
the Great Depression, the futility of austerity, and the need for a
"bottom-up" recovery and ongoing economic strategy.
I. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE AUSTERITY BIAS
Austerity comes in many forms. Central banks are usually not far
from the surface when tracing austerity back to its origin. Central
banks often tighten the money supply, raise interest rates at the first
whiff of inflation, and raise interest rates to protect or prop up their
currency. These examples of monetary austerity are associated with
rising unemployment and interest costs coupled with falling incomes
and declining tax revenues for governments at all levels-federal, state,
and local. These effects, in turn, place pressure on governments to
impose fiscal austerity in the form of spending cuts, tax hikes and user
fees, and the privatizations of state-owned assets and services usually
at bargain basement fire-sale prices. Rising public debt levels, and the
adverse reaction of financial markets, put pressure on governments to
turn to fiscal austerity, which is then often imposed as loan conditions
by central banks, such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), effectively a global central bank.
The crisis of 2007-2009 revealed an ever-widening range of central
bank policies contributing to austerity.4 The U.S. Federal Reserve and
foreign central banks played key roles in creating huge private debt
bubbles built on unsustainable asset price inflations through the
combination of easy money policies and lax supervision of lending
standards by central banks. When the asset bubbles burst, governments
at all levels faced falling tax revenues and rising cleanup costs, from
bank bailouts to unemployment compensation. Severe fiscal austerity
measures were often imposed on state and local governments across the
United States and on foreign countries, such as the so-called PIGS of
the Eurozone, including Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.
Pseudo-independent central bankers created a "moral hazard" by
propping up the big banks that had financed the bubble.5 Through
austerity, the losses would be shifted to taxpayers, consumers, workers,
4. See Timothy A. Canova, The New Global Dis/Order in Central Banking and Public
Finance, in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW (John D. Haskell & Ugo Mattei
eds., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 9-19) (on file with author) (describing the policy
objectives, tools, and responses of the Federal Reserve to the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis).
5. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 29 (2010). This has also been referred to as the
"Greenspan put"---"the idea that if trouble occurred in the markets, the Fed would come to
their rescue." Id. at 101.
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and the unemployed. And through austerity, new profit opportunities
would be created for big banks and hedge funds. Indeed, central banks
led by the Federal Reserve responded to the crisis in ways that
intensified austerity for large vulnerable segments of the population,
while propping up and subsidizing elite private financial interests.
The most visible face of the Federal Reserve System is the Fed's
Board of Governors in Washington, D.C. The Board consists of seven
governors appointed by the U.S. president and confirmed by the Senate.
Although this process provides a semblance of public accountability, Fed
governors serve fourteen-year terms, longer than three presidential
administrations and longer than any other federal official. In addition,
the terms are staggered so that the term of each governor expires every
two years, thereby limiting the number of appointments a president can
make in a single term.6 The Fed does not depend on congressional
appropriations, but instead funds itself from the interest it earns on its
holdings of Treasury securities. It is exempt from numerous procedural
requirements of administrative law that apply good governance norms
to most federal agencies. 7 Finally, monetary policy is not subject to
judicial review. As Professor Alfred Aman concludes, "Compared to most
other regulatory agencies, even independent commissions, the Fed is
remarkably free from direct political control."
'8
Over the years, some have attempted to reduce the influence of
private bankers by making the Board of Governors more accountable to
the representative branches of government. For instance, in 1962
President John F. Kennedy proposed revising the terms of the officers
and members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to synchronize
the terms of the Fed chairman and the U.S. president. This revision
would have allowed a new president "to nominate a chairman of his
choice for a term of four years conterminous with his own."9 However,
6. In addition, Fed governors are removable by the President only for cause. Alfred C.
Aman, Jr., Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by
the Federal Reserve Board, 74 IowA L. REV. 837, 850 (1989).
7. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2009) (providing exemption for
certain Federal Reserve directives and information that is part of its deliberative process);
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. § 4 (b)(1)-(2) (2010) (exempting any advisory
committee of the Federal Reserve System and the Central Intelligence Agency from
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act).
8. Aman, supra note 6, at 850.
9. John F. Kennedy, Message to the Congress Presenting the President's First
Economic Report, 16 PUB. PAPERS 54-55 (Jan. 22, 1962); see also DONALD GIBSON,
BATTLING WALL STREET: THE KENNEDY PRESIDENCY 30 (1994) (discussing the Commission
on Money and Credit's 1961 report; "[Kennedy] did quickly accept one of its
recommendations, which would allow the incoming president to designate a chairman who
served the same four years as the president.").
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the proposal was not acted on before Kennedy's death, and has not been
raised by any of his successors.
The Fed's monetary policy decisions are centralized in its Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the Board of
Governors and the presidents of the twelve regional Federal Reserve
Banks.10 While all twelve regional Fed presidents take part in FOMC
deliberations, only five can vote on policy decisions, while the remaining
seven serve in an ex officio capacity. The president of the New York Fed
always votes in FOMC meetings, while the other eleven regional Fed
presidents vote on a rotating basis. Therefore, selecting regional Fed
presidents is crucial to the formulation of monetary policy.
The boards of directors of the regional Fed banks are effectively
selected by the private commercial banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System and own shares of those regional Fed banks.
These boards, in turn, select the presidents of the regional Fed Banks
that sit on the Open Market Committee.11 This process presents several
inherent conflicts of interest. For instance, Jamie Dimon, the chief
executive of JP Morgan Chase, was on the N.Y. Federal Reserve Bank
board (the N.Y. Fed) at a time when his bank received billions of dollars
in emergency loans and significant regulatory relief from the Federal
Reserve. 12
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act), which was the Obama administration's
main legislative response to the crisis, purported to reform the
governance of the boards of the regional Fed Banks to dilute the
dominating influence of private banking shareholders. However, the
10. ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: VOLUME 1: 1913-1951,
430 (2003) (describing the creation and authority of the FOMC).
11. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 263 (describing the FOMC's creation,
membership, and regulations governing open-market transactions); id. § 304 (outlining
selection of Class A and B directors); id. § 305 (outlining selection of Class C directors); see
also Aman, supra note 6, at 848 n.49.
12. See Press Release, Senator Bernie Sanders, GAO Finds Serious Conflicts at the Fed
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/gao-finds-serious-
conflicts-at-the-fed. According to U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders, while Dimon was on the
board of the N.Y. Fed, JP Morgan Chase "received emergency loans from the Fed and was
used by the Fed as a clearing bank for the Fed's emergency lending programs. In 2008, the
Fed provided JP Morgan Chase with $29 billion in financing to acquire Bear Stearns. At
the time, Dimon persuaded the Fed to provide JP Morgan Chase with an 18-month
exemption from risk-based leverage and capital requirements. He also convinced the Fed
to take risky mortgage-related assets off of Bear Stearns balance sheet before JP Morgan
Chase acquired this troubled investment bank." Id.
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changes were completely cosmetic. 13 The same dynamic that existed
before the crisis still exists today: the regional Fed boards and the Open
Market Committee are dominated by banking and big business
interests, while effectively excluding all other public constituencies from
any genuine representation. Main Street groups, from small business
owners and student debtors to average workers and consumers, are
often negatively affected by the Fed's policies, yet they lack any voice or
seat at the table.
14
The Dodd-Frank Act also included a provision requiring the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct an audit of the
governance of the regional Fed Banks, including an examination of the
system of appointing directors and any actual or potential conflicts of
interest. 15 A year later, the GAO issued its report finding serious
conflicts of interest. For instance, in 2008, Stephen Friedman, the
chairman of the N.Y. Fed, was also on the board of directors of Goldman
Sachs and owned Goldman stock. At this time, the N.Y. Fed was
approving Goldman's application to become a bank holding company to
obtain access to the Fed's low-interest loans.1 6 Meanwhile, Friedman
chaired the search for a new president of the N.Y. Fed that resulted in
the selection of William Dudley, who had recently been a partner and
managing director at Goldman and served for a decade as its chief U.S.
economist. 17 Moreover, in September 2010, Reuters published a special
investigative report of the Federal Reserve's selective disclosure of
sensitive information about monetary policy to its favored clientele in
the private financial sector. These backroom exchanges are among the
many quid pro quos in a system of opaque subsidies and reveal part of a
bigger problem of private financial influence over economic decision
making.18
13. See Canova, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5-6) (providing a more complete
discussion of the significance of the changes in Class A, B, and C directors of the regional
Federal Reserve Banks).
14. See Simon Johnson, An Institutional Flaw at the Heart of the Federal Reserve, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2012, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/an-institutional-flaw-
at-the-heart-of-the-federal-reserve/.
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong., § 1109 (b)(1)(B)(i), (ii), (iv) (2010) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 5611-14
(2010)).
16. Sanders, supra note 12.
17. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Names William C. Dudley
President (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/aboutthefed/20O9/oa09
0127.html.
18. Kristina Cooke et al., Special Report: The Ties That Bind at the Federal Reserve,
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2010, 4:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/30/us-usa-fed-
idUSTRE68SO1020100930.
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These conflicts of interest also raise questions about the rigor and
impartiality of the regulatory supervision and oversight of the world's
biggest banks. For example, in 2009, the N.Y. Fed commissioned a
secret internal investigation of itself conducted by a Columbia
University finance professor. This investigation revealed "a culture of
suppression [that] discouraged regulatory staffers from voicing worries
about the banks they supervised." 19 The review recommended various
reforms for the N.Y. Fed to encourage "critical dialogue and continuous
questioning." Yet, four years later its culture was still in question when
one of its former bank examiners, Carmen Segarra, filed a lawsuit
alleging that the N.Y. Fed had interfered with her oversight of Goldman
Sachs. 20 Segarra's lawsuit could not be easily ignored since she had
secretly recorded audio of some forty-six hours of meetings and
conversations with her colleagues and superiors. Some of the most
damning recordings aired on "This American Life," a program on the
WBEZ-Chicago public radio station.
21
Although Wall Street influence and conflicts of interest are now
increasingly seen as problems in terms of the Fed's regulatory
responsibilities, there has been less attention paid to their impact on
Federal Reserve monetary policies. This anomaly stems from the broad
consensus of central bank independence. 22 The research departments of
central banks have produced a mountain of paid literature purporting to
prove a strong correlation between central banks' independence and low
inflation rates.23 However, the research demonstrates a consistent
pattern of selective presentation of evidence, a myopic focus on limited
19. Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, N.Y Fed Staff Afraid to Speak Up, Secret Review Found,
WALL ST. J. REAL TIME ECON. BLOG, (Sept. 26, 2014, 3:17 PM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/
economics/2014/09/26/n-y-fed-staff-afraid-to-speak-up-secret-review-found.
20. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., Rising Scrutiny as Banks Hire From the Fed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2014, at Al (covering the emergence of the Segarra allegation); Peter
Eavis, New York Fed Is Criticized on Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2014, at B1
(describing the oversight Senate hearing).
21. See Jake Bernstein, Inside the New York Fed: Secret Recordings and a Culture
Clash, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 6, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/carmen-
segarras-secret-recordings-from-inside-new-york-fed (describing the audio release).
22. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Central
Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability, Remarks at the Institute for
Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference 2 (May 26, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlbernanke20l0O525a.pdf (explaining the
case for Central Bank Independence).
23. Agustin Carstens & Luis I. Jdcome H., Latin American Central Bank Reform:
Progress and Challenges 15 tbl.6 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 05/114, 2005)
(comparing changes in macroeconomic indicators from the 1980s to 2003).
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variables and limited time periods, and flawed readings of history.24
Virtually none of these studies consider data from the 1920s to the mid-
1950s, thereby avoiding the 1929 stock market crash, the financial
panics of the early 1930s, the Great Depression, the economic boom of
the 1940s, and the more recent data from the 2008 financial collapse.
25
Most studies confine their analyses to the 1980s and 1990s while
overlooking any and all non-monetary explanations for variations in
inflation rates. In addition to the truncated period and focus of analysis,
these studies share a fixation on one variable-the rate of increase in a
rather flawed consumer price index-while ignoring all other kinds of
price inflations, most notably hyperinflations of asset prices, seen often
only in hindsight as unsustainable bubbles.
One study coauthored by Larry Summers, a main architect of
financial deregulation as undersecretary of Treasury in the late 1990s,
found no correlation between central bank independence and higher
economic growth rates precisely because Summers did not consider any
data prior to 1955 and focused primarily on the period from 1973 to
1988.26 However, if U.S. economic growth rates in the 1940s are
compared with growth rates in more recent years, the conclusions are
much different. In fact, U.S. gross national product (GNP) grew at an
average rate of about 5.4 percent a year during the 1940s when the
Federal Reserve was de facto politically directed,2 7 compared with
average annual GNP growth of about 2.4 percent from 1973 to 1987
when the Federal Reserve was far less accountable. 2 Therefore, real
economic growth rates were more than twice as high when the central
24. Timothy A. Canova, Central Bank Independence as Agency Capture: A Review of the
Empirical Literature, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL'Y REP. 11, 14-16 (2011); see Richard
A. Werner, What Accession Countries Need to Know About the ECB: A Comparative
Analysis of the Independence of the ECB, the Bundesbank and the Reichsbank, 6 INT'L FIN.
REV. 99 (2006).
25. In this way, they mimic the risk management models used by big banks and credit
rating agencies in the past decade to ignore the possibility of sharp drops in asset prices.
See Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From
Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
369, 381-82 (2009) (explaining the introduction of risk-based capital standards). See
generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2010) (using a collection of essays, the author explains how improbable
events that cause enormous consequences come to fruition and experts do not see them
coming).
26. Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 151, 160-61 (1993) (focusing on two periods, 1955-1988 and 1973-1988).
27. The 5.4% figure for the 1941-1951 period was calculated by averaging the annual
real GNP growth rates derived from Table B2. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
204 (1980), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/ERP/1980/ERP_1980.pdf.
28. See Alesina & Summers, supra note 26, at 160.
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bank was politically accountable compared to times when it had much
greater autonomy.
29
Some have argued that the 1940s do not present a fair comparison
because foreign competitors lost their industrial and export capacities in
the wartime destruction. 30 Such conclusions require overlooking the
production miracles of World War II, which would have occurred even if
German and Japanese factories were not being destroyed. These critics
also define prosperity purely in terms of private consumption. In any
event, soon after the war, the United States had a growing current
account payments deficit, a result of the combination of costly foreign
military commitments and the relatively speedy recovery of Western
Europe and Japan, due in large part to the Marshall Plan. The United
States extended the post-war boom through the use of active fiscal
policies that addressed major social problems. These policies included
the huge federal investment in the G.I. Bill of Rights program,
providing free higher education, income support, job training, housing,
and health care for an entire generation of returning veterans. The
benefits were massive in scale because military service was near
universal. Mass conscription helped win the war. After the war, this
ensured that the number of veterans receiving G.I. Bill support would
be massive, as nearly one-third of all U.S. families directly benefitted
from the G.I. Bill. The G.I. Bill was based on a view of citizenship in
which duties were reciprocal to rights and service was reciprocal to
benefits.31 Further, the G.I. Bill harmonized capitalism with the idea of
a civic republican and communitarian democracy.
Active fiscal policies continued to extend the post-war boom and
helped build a huge middle class. From the interstate highway system,
the aerospace program, and moon landings, to federal funding for basic
research and development, these policies produced long-term universal
benefits, incredible technological innovations, and spinoffs for
consumers and the private sector. Unfortunately, the orthodox view of
29. Ha-Joon Chang reaches similar conclusions for developing countries, where the
period prior to independent central banks was actually the most successful time for
developing countries, with per capita income growing by 3.0% annually in the 1960s and
1970s, above the 1.7% annual growth rates since the 1980s after central bank
independence and other neoliberal reforms were implemented. See HA-JOON CHANG, BAD
SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 27
(2008).
30. See generally Robert Higgs, Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S.
Economy in the 1940s, 52 J. ECON. HIST. 41 (1992).
31. See Timothy A. Canova, Democracy's Disappearing Duties: The Washington
Consensus and the Limits of Citizen Participation, in DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND WAR
200, 206-08 (Yoav Peled et al. eds., 2011) (describing the shared benefits of renewed
democracy).
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Summer, Bernanke, and others drew all the wrong lessons from the
1940s. They declared fiscal policy a failure and instead claimed that
monetary policies alone would sufficiently promote recovery and
economic development. Although a more thorough view of history
should have demonstrated the folly and danger of such an approach,
history was secondary to the calculus of interest group politics and the
profit maximization objectives of Wall Street. The Washington
Consensus view of citizenship was asymmetrical, a commitment to ever
expanding rights and subsidies for the elite and powerful alongside
disappearing duties and responsibilities for these same elites.
Mainstream economics has also avoided inquiring into the
distributional consequences of central bank capture. However, there is
significant empirical, theoretical, and econometric research not
associated with the research departments of central banks or Wall
Street banks, 32 which finds positive correlations between central bank
independence and growing inequalities in wealth and income.
33
Heterodox economists have also shown a strong correlation between
central bank independence and the pace of financial innovations,
including the enormous rise of complex derivative instruments.
34
Post-Keynesian and Institutional economists emphasize that
unregulated financial markets are not self-correcting, that economies
often stall at equilibriums far below potential, and that active fiscal
policy is perhaps the only path to rebuilding a stable and balanced
economy. 35 As many economists predicted, the consequence of so much
32. See generally BEYOND INFLATION TARGETING: ASSESSING THE IMPACTS AND POLICY
ALTERNATIVES (Gerald A. Epstein & A. Erinc Yeldan eds., 2009) (compiling theoretical
frameworks and country-specific alternatives to inflation targeting).
33. See id. at 8 (explaining the macroeconomic record of inflation targeting); Elissa
Braunstein & James Heintz, The Gendered Political Economy of Inflation Targeting:
Assessing its Impacts on Employment, in BEYOND INFLATION TARGETING: ASSESSING THE
IMPACTS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES, id. at 110-12 (concluding that in middle- and low-
income countries dealing with demand-pull inflation, inflation targeting is likely to
undermine economic growth); Arjun Jayadev, Income, Class and Preferences Towards
Anti-Inflation and Anti- Unemployment Policies, in BEYOND INFLATION TARGETING:
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES, id. at 87 (finding systematically
differential effects on the welfare of workers compared with owners, and on different
segments of the working class). See generally Jose Antonio Cordero, Economic Growth
Under Alternative Monetary Regimes: Inflation Targeting vs. Real Exchange Rate
Targeting, 22 INT'L REV. APPLIED ECON. 145 (2008) (using econometric analysis to
conclude that inflation targeting undermines growth and employment).
34. Gerald Epstein presents econometric evidence correlating independent central
banking with more speculative financial markets and lower rates of capacity utilization.
See Gerald Epstein, Political Economy and Comparative Central Banking, 24 REV.
RADICAL POL. ECON. 1 (1992).
35. See generally FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY AFTER THE GREAT
RECESSION (Charles J. Whalen ed., 2011) (stressing that, for economies to recover after
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financial innovation and self-regulation was to markedly increase the
fragility of the financial system, 36 resulting in a global financial collapse
in the fall of 2008, a phenomenon that the orthodox neoclassical schools
of economics did not even see coming.
The myth of central bank independence helps deflect charges of
agency capture. Although the Federal Reserve and foreign central banks
may be independent of politicians, the question of their independence
from private moneyed interests is completely overlooked by the
orthodoxy. Mainstream literature considers a number of categories to
gauge a particular central bank's degree of political independence,
including its legal, goal, operational, and management independence. 3
7
But tellingly, no category in the literature analyzes a central bank's
relative independence from the private financial interests that play such
a significant role in central bank governance.
Although heterodox schools have provided far more coherent
diagnoses and prescriptions of financial crises than the orthodoxies,
these schools remain marginalized. 38 What explains the lasting power of
the orthodoxy? John Maynard Keynes, the groundbreaking British
economist who provided the theoretical justification for active fiscal
policy during the Great Depression, once observed, "In economics you
cannot convict your opponent of error, you can only convince him of it."39
Economics is not a hard science like physics or chemistry, with
predictability and verifiable laws of nature. The subjective and limiting
the Great Recession, nations must evolve their economic thinking, integrate finance with
macroeconomics, and pay close attention to expectations).
36. See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2008)
(presenting a theoretical explanation of the effect of deregulation on the global economy);
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005) (describing the authors' reservations about
deregulation and warning of the impending Great Recession).
37. See J. Ram6n Martinez-Resano, Central Bank Financial Independence 7
(Documento Ocasional No. 0401, 2004), available at
http://www.bde.es/flwebbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/Document
osOcasionales04/Fic/doO4Ole.pdf (outlining the factual categories of institutional
freedoms that characterize the degree of central bank independence); Amirul Ahsan et al.,
Determinants of Central Bank Independence and Governance: Problems and Policy
Implications, 1 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE 47, 50 (2006), http://joaag.com/uploads/4-
_AhsanSkullyWickramanayakeRevised.pdf (identifying classified subsections of
determinants).
38. The liberalization agenda was justified by a variety of pseudo-scientific orthodox
economic theories, including rational expectations, real business cycle theory, and the
efficient financial market theory-all of which were discredited by the present financial
crisis, but live on by force of momentum and career-long commitments in the academy. See
ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER 29-46 (2009).
39. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, 13 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
470 (Elizabeth Johnson & Donald Moggridge eds., 1978).
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assumptions of orthodox economic models make these models impossible
to disprove. And the entrenched positions of orthodox economists in elite
universities and central banks apparently make it impossible to
convince them of the flaws in their models.
II. THE MORAL HAZARD OF ALAN GREENSPAN
Alan Greenspan, perhaps more than any other central banker of the
past generation, embodied the intersection of the Wall Street and
Washington agendas. He had been a director at J.P. Morgan prior to his
appointment as Federal Reserve chairman in 1987, and when he
stepped down from the Fed in 2006, he landed back on Wall Street, well
positioned to take advantage of the impending crash in global financial
markets. Greenspan's was a well-worn path, a "revolving door," between
the finance industry, elite universities, federal regulators, and central
banks. Whatever side of the door, the policy agenda has been the same:
the so-called Washington Consensus, also known as neoliberalism or
market fundamentalism. 40 The main pillars of the agenda are the
liberalization of trade and finance, deregulation, privatization, central
bank independence, and fiscal consolidation.
Central bankers have also referred to their own Jackson Hole
Consensus consisting of several key rules of sound economic
management, including central bank independence, the primacy of
monetary over fiscal policy, and elevating the objective of price stability
over employment or income growth. 41 Like the related Washington
Consensus, this consensus is more related to ideology and faith than to
scientific proof. Both of these agendas reflect the interests of private
banking constituencies. 42 Quite predictably, consensus policies often
result in declining incomes and living standards for middle and working
class populations, and rising income, wealth, and influence for financial
40. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 53-54 (2002)
(describing the three pillars of Washington Consensus advice). The Washington
Consensus has also been referred to as a Washington-Wall Street Consensus, indicating
the symbiotic relationship between the two. With shades of Eisenhower's 'Military
Industrial Complex," Jagdish Bhagwati's reference to a 'Wall Street-Treasury-IMF
complex" also suggests the influence and capture of federal and multilateral agencies by
private financial actors. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 205-06
(2004).
41. The Jackson Hole Consensus gets its name from a paper presented at the Federal
Reserve's annual economic symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, by Charles Bean, then
a top official at the Bank of England. NEIL IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS: THREE CENTRAL
BANKERS AND A WORLD ON FIRE 97-98 (2013).
42. BLYTH, supra note 3, at 156-158 (linking central bank independence to the
austerity agenda).
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elites. Even before the crisis, the consensus agenda revealed a bias
toward austerity, transforming the United States from an economy
based on widely shared prosperity to a winner-take-all society.
43
Central bank independence, as well as the rest of the consensus
agenda, depends on the view that unelected central bankers are more
trustworthy stewards of the economy than are elected politicians who
may pander to voters. Greenspan, as central-banker-in-chief and the
'Maestro," preached a "New Economy" based on deregulation and self-
regulation by Wall Street financial institutions.44 Arguably, he did more
than anyone to deregulate high finance on Wall Street.45 Greenspan
opened substantial loopholes in the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which had
separated commercial banking from securities and investment
banking.46 He successfully lobbied for its repeal in 1999 with passage of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act.
47
Throughout the 1990s, he encouraged the growing market in financial
derivatives, which are complex financial instruments often used for
speculative purposes.
Some legal scholars consider the proliferation of derivatives as the
most direct cause of the systemic financial crisis in 2008.
48
Traditionally, under English and U.S. common law, courts did not
enforce purely speculative derivative contracts in which neither party
owned the underlying asset as these were considered gambling
contracts. 49 This rule was codified in the Grain Futures Act of 1922 and
reenacted during the New Deal as the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)
of 1936.50 But things began to change during Greenspan's tenure as Fed
chairman. By the early 1990s, Congress allowed the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to exempt privately negotiated
over-the-counter (OTC) swaps from regulation and preempt state anti-
43. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL
SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW AT THE ToP GET SO MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1996)
(outlining the spread of "winner-take-all markets," where small performance differences
lead to huge reward differentials).
44. Jacob M. Schlesinger, Did Greenspan Push His Optimism About the New Economy
Too Far?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2001, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100949131638223
6920.
45. See Timothy A. Canova, Legacy of the Clinton Bubble, DISSENT, Summer 2008, at
43-47 (discussing Greenspan's laissez-faire philosophy).
46. The Long Demise of Glass-Steagall, PBS FRONTLINE (May 8, 2003), http://www.pbs.
org/wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weilldemise.html.
47. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 12 U.S.C. § 1811
(1999).
48. Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2011).
49. Id. at 11.
50. Id. at 12, 17.
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wagering and anti-bucketshop laws. 51 Although there were plenty of
warning signs, Greenspan continued to support a completely
deregulated environment. In April 1994, Proctor & Gamble announced a
$157 million trading loss from speculating on interest rates through
derivatives. A few months later, Orange County, California filed for
bankruptcy after more than $2 billion in losses on highly leveraged
derivatives.5 2 In October 1998, the Long Term Capital Management
hedge fund suddenly imploded under the weight of huge trading losses
on interest rate and currency derivatives. It took a $4 billion industry
financed bailout, brokered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to
prevent huge losses from further spreading to the biggest banks.
These events did not deter Greenspan and others from beating back
an effort by the CFTC, headed by Brooksley Born, to exercise regulatory
authority over financial derivatives. 53 Congress eventually overruled
Born and passed the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000
(CFMA) to provide legal cover for OTC derivatives. 54 Derivatives
exploded in volume over the next decade, with over $50 trillion in credit
default swaps and several hundred trillion dollars in interest rate and
currency derivatives.
According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, created by
President Obama to investigate the causes of the 2008 crisis, credit
default swaps facilitated the sale of risky and ultimately toxic mortgage
related securities, thereby greatly increasing the exposure of the sellers
of these swaps to the housing bubble's collapse.55 These and other
derivatives, such as synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),
enabled speculators to bet against the housing bubble, including
Goldman Sachs, which had bet against the same mortgage bonds and
CDOs that it had created and already sold off to unsuspecting clients
and investors.
56
Greenspan supported the Bush supply-side tax cuts and provided
significant monetary stimulus throughout the early 2000s. He also
ignored repeated warnings and requests from the Federal Reserve's
Consumer Advisory Council and Fed governor Edward Gramlich to use
the Fed's considerable authority under the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994 to investigate and regulate abuses in
51. Id. at 19-20.
52. Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From
Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1295, 1348 (1995).
53. Stout, supra note 48, at 20, 21.
54. Id. at 21.
55. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 155 (2011),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
56. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 195-197
(2010).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:2
the subprime mortgage market. 57 Sheila Bair, chair of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 2006 to 2011, later told the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that the authority of the Fed to set
mortgage lending rules under HOEPA was the "one bullet" left in the
regulatory arsenal that might have prevented the financial crisis.
58
While Greenspan's regulatory inaction encouraged the growth of
risky mortgage securities, federal regulators could have limited the risk
to the so-called "Too Big To Fail" banks, including the largest
commercial and investment banks, by reducing their leverage and
imposing higher capital requirements. The 2004 Basel II capital
guidelines, set by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, called for "risk-weighted" capital
standards. 59 In a coordinated November 2001 rulemaking by four
federal regulators, including the Federal Reserve, risk weights were
lowered from 50 percent to 20 percent for banks and thrifts on their
holdings of triple-A or double-A rated private-label mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs).60 This rulemaking effectively reduced capital ratios
from 4 percent to 1.6 percent for banks purchasing private-label MBS,
including those with underlying mortgages consisting of high-risk
Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs), liar's loans, and subprime
loans with low down payments.6 1 In addition, Basel II permitted large
commercial banks and bank holding companies to use their own
internal risk assessment models to calculate their regulatory capital for
their securities portfolios, thereby often reducing their effective capital
ratios further.62 With the complicity of the major credit rating agencies,
banks increased their leverage ratios and stockpiled subprime mortgage
bonds.
The Bush administration's Securities and Exchange Commission
would eventually follow the Basel II approach to greatly reduce capital
standards for the largest investment banks.63 This approach permitted
57. JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE'S HOUSES: How DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE
REGULATORS, AND ToxIc BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS 227
(2014).
58. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 55, at 94.
59. TAUB, supra note 57, at 232-33.
60. The other federal regulators that joined the coordinated rulemaking were the
Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
61. TAUB, supra note 57, at 232-33.
62. Internal risk assessment models were first introduced in a 1996 Market Risk
Amendment to the Basel Rules. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 55, at 151.
63. Id. at 150-54; Timothy A. Canova, George W. Bush and the Failure of Laissez-
Faire, in THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 16) (on
file with author).
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these banks to borrow as much as forty dollars for each dollar of capital,
leaving them vulnerable to even a small drop in asset prices and
increase in funding costs, without the capital to absorb modest, let alone
significant losses.64 According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, this contributed to the "need for government bailouts of all
five of the [largest] investment banks during the financial crisis."65 Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers closed, Bank of America acquired Merrill
Lynch, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley quickly converted into
bank holding companies to gain access to the Fed's discount lending
window.
By early 2006, the writing was on the wall. Markets were due for a
crash. Goldman Sachs was betting through derivatives against the
mortgage market and CDOs that it had created and sold to investors.66
In mid-2006, President Bush named Henry Paulson, the CEO of
Goldman Sachs, as his new Treasury secretary. This placed Paulson in
the perfect position to help his former firm and the rest of Wall Street
when the panic hit in 2008. He proposed and crafted the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) authorizing the Treasury to spend up to $700
billion to prop up the largest banks.6 7 U.S. banks and thrifts would
suffer large losses in late 2008 and into 2009, but thanks to TARP and
the Fed's huge liquidity and asset purchase programs, these financial
institutions would return to high profit levels a year later.
68
In 2004, President Bush reappointed Greenspan to a fifth term as
Federal Reserve chairman, but Greenspan stepped down in 2006, two
years early. His resignation was just in time as he could now return to
Wall Street to take advantage of the upcoming crash. He became an
advisor to the Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO), the
world's largest mutual fund, which would make billions in profits on its
64. See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT'S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2014) (linking the lack of
borrowing regulation to resulting effects in the banking industry).
65. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 55, at 155.
66. Greg Gordon, Goldman Executives: We Made Money Betting Against Mortgage
Market, McCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Apr. 24, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com210/04/
24/92812/goldman-e-mails-we-made-money.html (reporting that Goldman marketed $57
billion in risky mortgage securities in 2006 and 2007 without informing investors that it
was secretly shorting the housing market).
67. Timothy A. Canova, The Bottom-Up Recovery: A New Deal in Banking and Public
Finance, in WHEN GOVERNMENT HELPED: LEARNING FROM THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
OF THE NEW DEAL 51, 52-3 (Sheila D. Collins & Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg eds., 2013).
68. Robin Sidel & Saabira Chaudhuri, U.S. Bank Profits Near Record Levels, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 11, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-banking-industry-profits-racing-to-near-
record-levels-1407773976 (including chart of quarterly total net income at U.S. banks and
thrifts from 2004 to 2014).
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bond holdings from the Fed's asset purchase programs. 69 Greenspan
also joined the Deutsche Bank's investment banking team and Paulson
& Co., the giant U.S. hedge fund that made billions in profits in 2007
when it bet correctly on the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. 70
III. BEN BERNANKE'S MONETARY MYOPIA ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION
Ben Bernanke auditioned for the job of Federal Reserve chairman
while serving as a Fed governor from 2002 to 2005 and as chief of the
Bush Administration's Council of Economic Advisers in 2005-2006. In a
2002 speech, he provided assurances that the Fed could prevent any
future deflation and depression by simply printing money (or the
electronic equivalent) and then making the equivalent of a "helicopter
drop" of its newly issued dollars.7 ' As Fed chairman, Bernanke would
spend trillions of dollars not on the general population, but instead on
the largest financial institutions to ensure their solvency and survival.
He rejected all proposals for any "bottom-up" support targeted directly
to small and moderate sized businesses, as did the Fed in the 1930s and
1940s.72 Instead, under Bernanke, all Fed support was trickle-down,
going solely to Wall Street interests with none going to Main Street.
President Obama rewarded "Helicopter Ben" by reappointing him as
Fed chairman, and Time magazine named him person of the year for
2009.73
In his academic work on the Great Depression, Bernanke viewed
monetary reflation of the banking system as the one, and perhaps sole,
effective policy option. He credits President Roosevelt's "bank holiday"
in March 1933, the introduction of deposit insurance, and the efforts of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Federal Home Loan Banks
to prop up creditors. He concludes that it was this financial
69. Carrick Mollenkamp & Cezary Podkul, Special Report: Pimco Shook Hands with
the Fed - and Made a Killing, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2013, 10:59 AM, available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/27/usa-qe3-pimco-idUKL2NOGF1 1020130927.
70. Angela Monaghan, Greenspan Joins Hedge Fund Paulson, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan.
15, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uklfinance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/2782593/
Greenspan-joins-hedge-fund-Paulson.html.
71. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 78
(2009).
72. CANOVA, supra note 4 (manuscript at 12); see generally Canova, supra note 67
(discussing Roosevelt's use of the "bottom-up" approach).
73. Neil Irwin, Obama Picks Bernanke for Second Term as Federal Reserve Chairman,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
08/25/AR2009082501115.html; Michael Grunwald, Person of the Year 2009: Ben Bernanke,
TIME, Dec. 16, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packagesarticle/0,28804,
1946375_1947251_1947520,00.html.
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rehabilitation that helped increase employment during the
Depression. 74 This is the trickle-down view that propping up big banks
is sufficient to ensure renewed bank lending and new hiring by
businesses. As is true with so much of orthodox thinking, the causation
may be backward. It ignores the many millions of jobs created directly
through New Deal public works and infrastructure projects. As New
Deal fiscal policy provided workers, consumers, and debtors with badly
needed income, rehabilitation of the banking system could finally be
sustained.
Bernanke also suggests that higher real wages in Europe would
have been counterproductive during the Depression.7 5 This theory
constitutes the austerity view, that rising wages undermines
international competitiveness and corporate profits. But the failure of
wage austerity under the Bruning government in Weimar Germany led
to the rise of Hitler (and ironically, to the Nazi recovery program based
on active fiscal policy and massive public works and jobs programs).
76
Bernanke ignores such lessons and concludes that if monetary
accommodation is insufficient to counter deflationary forces, then the
solution must be even easier monetary policy in the future.77 These
views animated Bernanke's approach to the Great Recession of 2007-
2009: when the Fed's first round of quantitative easing (QE) asset
purchases proved insufficient to maintain recovery, the only solution
was successive new rounds of QE asset purchases.
In his academic work on the Great Depression, Bernanke has
overlooked an impressive body of empirical evidence and economic
analysis suggesting the crucial role of fiscal policy. The index to
Bernanke's Essays on The Great Depression does not even have an entry
for fiscal policy. In making the sweeping assertion that rehabilitation of
the banking system "was the only major New Deal program that
successfully promoted economic recovery,"78 Bernanke's only support is
a single footnote that cites to the work of E. Cary Brown, who according
to Bernanke, "argued that New Deal fiscal policy was not very
74. BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 62-63, 253 (2000).
75. Id. at 253.
76. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929-1939, at 139-40, 153,
174-77 (1973); LYNN TURGEON, STATE AND DISCRIMINATION 20 (1989) (the 10% wage cut
during imposed by the Bruening government resulted in more than 30% unemployment in
Germany); LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM 1-3, 122-123 (1996) (arguing that
public works greatly reduced German unemployment in the early 1930s).
77. BERNANKE, supra note 74, at 7, 34.
78. Id. at 63 (emphasizing the monetary factors in the eventual worldwide recovery in
output and prices).
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constructive. 79 Orthodox Democratic economists, including Christina
Romer,8 0 who chaired President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers
in 2009-2010, and Larry Summers,81 director of Obama's National
Economic Council, made many of the same arguments against the
efficacy of fiscal policy that were made during the Great Depression.
Perhaps such a pessimistic view of fiscal policy has become a
prerequisite for an appointment to the Federal Reserve or as a White
House economist.
In an article cited by Romer, Summers once again discounted the
importance of fiscal policy during the 1940s, arguing that "it is hard to
attribute any of the pre-1942 catch-up of the economy to the war."8 2
Summers apparently agrees with Bernanke's conclusion that fiscal
policy was not the engine of recovery, and subscribes to the idea that
monetary policy helped clear the way for a natural recovery, a reversion
to the pre-Depression mean. More convincing is the work of J. R.
Vernon, who in 1994 concluded, 'World War II fiscal policies were the
most important factor in the recovery not only during 1942, but during
1941 as well; and more than half of the recovery in output from its 1933
low-point occurred during 1941 and 1942."83 It is difficult to argue with
the numbers. In the first six months of the war, the federal government
placed over $100 billion in war contracts, thereby ordering more goods
than the economy had ever produced in a single year.84 World War II
was the fiscal program that ended the Great Depression once and for
all. Yet, in none of his published writings on the Great Depression does
Bernanke address or even mention Vernon's work.8 5
79. Id. at 63 n.32. In this footnote, Bernanke also refers to a paper by Michael
Weinstein that "points out counterproductive aspects of the N.R.A." Id. However, it is
misleading for Bernanke to conflate fiscal policy with the National Recovery
Administration. The NRA sought to raise prices by cartelizing industry, an approach that
had nothing to do with fiscal policy.
80. See, e.g., Christina D. Romer, What Ended the Great Depression?, 52 J. ECON. HIST.
757, 757 (1992) ("[T]he rapid rates of growth of real output in the mid- and late 1930s were
largely due to conventional aggregate-demand stimulus, primarily in the form of monetary
expansion.").
81. See, e.g., J. Bradford De Long & Lawrence H. Summers, How Does Macroeconomic
Policy Affect Output?, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTviTY 433 (1988) (arguing for the
efficacy of monetary policy in post-Depression economic recovery while largely ignoring
fiscal policy).
82. Id. at 467.
83. J.R. Vernon, World War II Fiscal Policies and the End of the Great Depression, 54
J. ECON. HIST. 850, 850-51 (1994).
84. Canova, supra note 31, at 202.
85. See, e.g., BERNANKE, supra note 74; Ben S. Bernanke, Member, Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Money, Gold, and the Great Depression, H. Parker Willis Lecture in
Economic Policy at Washington and Lee University (Mar. 2, 2004), available at
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/bernankebernanke_20040302.pdf.
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Perhaps most troubling and revealing is Bernanke's complete
mischaracterization of Brown's conclusion that "New Deal fiscal policy
was not very constructive."8 6 This is a strained and self-serving reading
of Brown's work, which in reality suggests the exact opposite of
Bernanke's conclusions.8 7 In his influential 1956 article in the American
Economic Review, Brown concluded that fiscal policy at all levels of
government combined-federal, state, and local-was expansionary in
only two years during the 1930s. 88 However, Brown also pointed out
that the federal government's fiscal position was mostly expansionary
throughout the 1930s, while state and local government fiscal positions
were mostly contractionary8 9 Without the federal New Deal spending,
the cumulative impact of state and local austerity would have surely
contributed to an ongoing contraction. Instead, federal spending helped
cancel out the depressionary effects of state and local austerity. The
Depression would have been much longer and more painful for millions
of families without the federal government's active fiscal policy and
wide reaching New Deal programs that directly employed millions of
people and helped reflate aggregate demand and consumer and investor
confidence.
In characterizing the federal government's fiscal position as either
expansionary or contractionary, Bernanke, Romer, and other
mainstream economists treat tax policy no differently than they do
changes in government spending. 90 Brown concluded that the reason
fiscal policy was contractionary in the 1930s was "attributable to the
sharp increase in tax structures, enacted at all levels of government"
with much of the burden on lower- and middle-income groups.91 During
World War II, taxes rose dramatically on higher-income groups while
federal spending rose even faster than did tax revenues. The experience
of the 1930s and 1940s provides lessons for the crisis of today by
suggesting that a shifting of tax burdens to higher income groups while
increasing government spending on infrastructure and jobs programs
could lead to a stronger recovery. This experience was also one of the
Keynesian lessons, which revealed that redistributing income from the
higher income groups to lower income groups through tax and spending
86. BERNANKE, supra note 74, at 63 n.32.
87. E. Cary Brown, Fiscal Policy in the 'Thirties: A Reappraisal, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 857
(1956).
88. Id. at 863.
89. Id. at 867.
90. Romer bases her conclusions about the relative expansionary or contractionary
effect of fiscal policy on the "ratio of the real federal surplus to real GNP." Romer, supra
note 80, at 762.
91. Brown, supra note 87, at 867-68.
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fiscal policies would likely increase consumer spending and effective
aggregate demand.
Bernanke rejects such conclusions: "Absent implausibly large
differences in marginal spending propensities among the groups . . .
pure redistribution should have no significant macroeconomic effects."
92
In accepting top-heavy distributions of wealth and income, Bernanke's
view is a sign of our times. He makes no mention of how a weak
economy could alter marginal spending propensities on all income
levels, whereby an extra dollar in the hands of a middle- or working-
class family is more likely to be spent on consumption than it is on an
extra dollar for those with the highest incomes. 93 Not surprisingly,
Bernanke's approach to the 2008 crisis did not include any strategies
designed to redistribute income to debtors as a more direct way to
reduce financial distress. To the contrary, the Fed's monetary policies,
under both Bernanke and Greenspan, led to greater redistributions of
wealth and income from lower and middle income groups to higher
income groups.
Brown's most important conclusion, recognized by Romer but
completely ignored by Bernanke, is that fiscal policy was not all that
successful as a recovery strategy "not because it did not work, but
because it was not tried."94 Tax increases at all levels of government and
spending cuts by state and local governments kept the overall fiscal
position from playing a significant and sustained expansionary role. The
practical lesson should be to cut taxes and/or increase government
spending in a weak economy. Instead, Bernanke dismisses the
significance of fiscal policy, with the exception of his support for the
continuation of the Bush tax rates, which lowered taxes on higher
income groups. 95 Meanwhile, he would have (and did have) the central
bank spend trillions of dollars in newly issued money on Wall Street.
9 6
For everyone else, there would be austerity and trickle-down fairy tales.
92. BERNANKE, supra note 74, at 24 (explaining and taking favorably Irving Fisher's
debt-deflation theory).
93. Recession also has a way of reducing the velocity of money transactions, thereby
deepening the debt-deflation cycle. Bernanke did recognize that wealth redistributions
from debt deflations could have aggregate effects when "they are of the form to induce
systematic financial distress." Id. at 34. But his preferred solution to systematic stress is
always and only central bank support for creditors and financial markets, which
perpetuates the top-heavy distributions.
94. Brown, supra note 87, at 863-66.
95. Scott Lanman & Ryan J. Donmoyer, Bernanke Says Tax-Cut Extension Maintains
Stimulus, BLOOMBERG Bus., July 23, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles2010-
07-23lbernanke-says-extending-bush-tax-cuts-would-maintain-stimulus-to-economy.
96. WESSEL, supra note 71, at 78 (2009) (bearing the sub-subtitle, "How the Federal
Reserve Became the Fourth Branch of Government").
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IV. AUSTERITY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S "TRICKLE-DOWN"
MONETARY POLICY
The Federal Reserve serves as "lender of last resort," lending
directly to commercial banks through its so-called discount lending
window. 97 Traditionally, only commercial banks had access to the Fed's
discount lending since non-bank financial institutions were not subject
to the same reserve and capital requirements imposed on banks. The
other major source of the Fed's power is its ability to purchase financial
assets from its primary bond dealers. The Fed's asset purchases were
traditionally limited to short-term Treasury securities.98  These
restrictions on Fed lending and asset purchases helped support the
central bank's political independence from Congress and the White
House by ensuring that Fed policy was socially neutral and did not favor
particular sections of financial markets or particular private
constituencies. But, as the Federal Reserve's lending and asset purchase
powers expanded in unprecedented ways under Ben Bernanke in 2008,
these traditional restrictions were swept aside, exposing the flaws of
central bank independence.
The Fed also creates money-U.S. dollars, also known as Federal
Reserve Notes-which means there is virtually no limit to the amount of
money it can lend and no limit to the volume of assets it can purchase
without adding to public sector borrowing or deficits. During the 2008-
2009 financial crisis, the Fed extended more than $16 trillion in low
interest loans to all kinds of financial institutions in distress, including
borrowers who traditionally lacked access to its discount window, such
as hedge funds and foreign commercial banks and central banks.99 Also,
beginning in 2008, the Fed launched several asset purchase programs,
known as Quantitative Easing or QE, to purchase more than $3.5
97. Depository institutions that are short on reserves can borrow short-term from other
banks in the overnight lending market. The rate charged on such loans is known as the
federal funds rate. Banks can also borrow directly from the Fed's discount window at the
discount rate set by each of the Fed's regional Reserve Banks, subject to the approval of
the Board of Governors. See id. at 27-50.
98. Timothy A. Canova, Who Runs the Fed?, 62 DISSENT 126, 126 (2015). In the 1990s,
nearly 60% of the Fed's holdings were in the form of Treasury bills (with maturities of one
year or less) and about a quarter in Treasury notes (with maturities of over one year and
less than five years). BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 37 (8th ed., 1994). By 2006, the Fed's
holdings had shifted somewhat, with nearly half in Treasury bills and about a third in
Treasury notes. Not much of the Fed's portfolio was in longer Treasury maturities. See BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 93RD ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 329 (2006),
available at http://www.federalreserve.govfboarddocs/rptcongress/annual06/pdf/ar06.pdf.
99. Press Release, Bernie Sanders, U.S. Senator for Vt., The Fed Audit (July 21, 2011),
available at http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/the-fed-audit.
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trillion in U.S. Treasury securities and MBSs. 10 0 But this expansion of
the money supply is deceiving. Instead of lending out the funds supplied
by the Fed, banks have added almost $3 trillion to their excess reserves
and the Fed has paid them interest on those reserves. 101 This is similar
to what happened during the Great Depression. 102 Much of the money
the Fed pushed into the banking system has not trickled down to the
real economy.
Bernanke, the Fed chairman when the QE programs were first
launched, claimed that asset purchases would have a "wealth effect"103:
by the Fed purchasing bonds in such large amounts, bond prices would
rise, yields would fall, and investors would shift into riskier securities,
driving up the price of corporate shares and stock markets. 04 Everyone
would feel richer, businesses would invest, and consumers would spend
more. This seems similar to the theory of "trickle-down" fiscal policy:
that tax cuts for those with high incomes would be invested, thereby
leading to the hiring of additional workers and spreading the benefits to
the rest of the economy. Like the Bush administration's tax cuts, the
Fed's monetary trickle-down also has not worked. The lending and asset
purchase programs have effectively propped up Wall Street interests-
big banks and financial markets-but they have also neglected the
needs of Main Street, including the small community banks, small and
moderate sized and family-owned businesses, unemployed and
underemployed workers, and state and local governments.
The Federal Reserve's response to the 2008 crisis is quite different
from its "bottom up" approach in the Great Depression in the 1930s
when it extended credit directly to Main Street businesses. Section 13(3)
100. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42962, FEDERAL RESERVE:
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY OPTIONS 3 (2014), available at
http://fas.orgsgp/crs/misc/R42962.pdf; see Christopher Rude, The Role of the Federal
Reserve: Lender of Last Resort, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES 602, 605-8 (Martin H. Wolfson & Gerald A. Epstein eds., 2013)
(detailing the Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis, including quantitative
easing).
101. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Political Diary: Federal Reserve Excess, WALL ST. J., Oct.
23, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304069604579153290395722608.
102. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960, at 449-62 (1963) (discussing the policies of private banks
during the Depression).
103. Ben S. Bernanke, Aiding the Economy: What the Fed did and why, WASH. POST,
Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20lO/11/03/AR20
10110307693.html (arguing that the Fed's asset purchases would increase stock prices
and thereby "boost consumer wealth" and economic expansion).
104. See RICHARD A. WERNER, PRINCES OF THE YEN: JAPAN'S CENTRAL BANKERS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMY 256, 326-27 n.75 (2003) (discussing the effect of bond
purchases by central banks).
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of the Federal Reserve Act allowed the Fed to lend directly, not just to
big banks, but also to "individuals, partnerships, and corporations" in
"unusual and exigent circumstances." 10 5 Another provision, section
13(b), authorized the Fed to make credit available for "working capital
to established industrial and commercial businesses" with permissible
maturities of up to five years and "without any limitations as to the type
of security" for collateral.10 6 In total, the Fed made about $280 million
available to small and moderate sized businesses. That was about 0.43
percent of GDP at the time, or about $65 billion today.
10 7
In contrast, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial panic, the Federal
Reserve has consistently rejected proposals to lend directly to Main
Street, including proposals for loans to state infrastructure banks; to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (two government supported entities that
hold trillions of dollars in mortgages) to modify underwater mortgages;
and to students to refinance their debts. Throughout this time, Fed
officials adopted the view that they lack the legal authority for such
lending and, in particular, that federal law requires there be "good
collateral" for any such loans.
10 8
However, such requirements did not stop the Federal Reserve from
lending $29 billion to J.P. Morgan Chase to purchase Bear Stearns in
March 2008, secured only by Bearn Stearns' shaky mortgage-related
assets.10 9 This move led Paul Volcker, a former Fed chairman, to express
concern that the Fed's intervention was testing the limits of its lawful
powers and would call into question the Fed's political independence if
the central bank was viewed "as the rescuer or supporter of a particular
section of the market," such as mortgage-backed securities,
105. Federal Reserve Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006), amended by Dodd-Frank Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title XI, § 1101(a), 124 Stat. 2113 (current version at Federal
Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C.S. § 343(A) (LexisNexis 2015)); see Canova, supra note 67.
106. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-417, 48 Stat. 1108, repealed by Small Business
Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 690; David Fettig, Lender of More
Than Last Resort, THE REGION, Dec. 2002, at 15, 19, available at https://www.
minneapolisfed.org/-/media/files/pubs/region/O2-12[lender.pdf.
107. Fettig, supra note 106, at 45.
108. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal
Reserve Response to the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv.,
111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
bernanke20090210a.htm.
109. BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 77 (2013); see
also id. The Fed's $16 trillion lending program was not without its rationalizers who
argued for interpreting the Bagehot rule as lending freely "against collateral that will be
good in the long run (even if it is not good today)." Willem H. Buiter, Prof. of Eur. Pol.
Econ., Central Banks and Financial Crises, Presentation at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City Symposium: Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System (Aug. 23,
2008), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/200S8Buiter.03.12.09.pdf.
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collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and other exotic financial
instruments. 110 Volcker warned that such allocation decisions are
inherently political, "not strictly a monetary function in the way it's
been interpreted in the past," and are more properly made by the
elected branches of government as fiscal policy.' Yet, throughout
2008-2009, the Fed expanded its lending well beyond its traditional
statutory authority, including to primary dealers in U.S. Treasury
securities and foreign exchange swap lines for foreign central banks."
2
The Fed also lent more than $700 billion to a facility of its own creation,
a "special purpose entity," to purchase commercial paper directly from
major corporate borrowers, which helped support big businesses and
cartels, while ignoring the small and moderate sized and family
enterprises that give life to Main Streets across the country." 3 It was
clear that the courts and political branches of government would not
interfere with the Fed's determination of what constitutes good
collateral and the scope of its lawful powers in "unusual and exigent
circumstances," particularly when helping Wall Street in a crisis.
The Federal Reserve expanded its support for Wall Street in other
unconventional ways that also suggested a bias in favor of the private
financial interests that sit on the Fed's own governing boards. In the fall
of 2008, the Fed made an emergency equity investment in American
International Group (AIG), taking a 79.9 percent interest in the global
insurance conglomerate, to make sure that AIG continued paying off on
its credit default swaps (CDS) to Goldman Sachs and other
counterparties. 114 These swaps provided insurance against a downturn
in the housing and mortgage markets. However, swaps also allowed
Goldman Sachs and other speculators to bet against the same toxic
mortgage-backed securities that they had created and already sold off to
unsuspecting clients and investors. By rescuing AIG, an extraordinary
measure that tested the limits of its authority, the Fed was now the
"buyer, dealer, and gambler of last resort," serving as the gambling
house to prop up the market for derivative contracts and cover the
wagers and losses of the global casino." 5
Goldman Sachs and other giant banks and hedge funds have
engaged in similar shady and speculative activities abroad, including
110. Greg Ip, Fed Balance Sheet Worries Volcker, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2008, at A3.
111. Id.
112. Rude, supra note 100, at 607.
113. Id.
114. See generally LEWIS, supra note 56 (discussing a motive for the Fed's emergency
equity investment in AIG).
115. See generally PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2011) (tracing the evolution of ideas and
institutions in the U.S. banking system).
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betting on Greek, Spanish, and Italian sovereign and private debt.
Through the use of derivatives, Goldman Sachs shorted the same Greek
debt that it previously aided the Greek government in hiding through
repo transactions. 116 The response of the ECB and IMF assured that
these speculators' bets would be paid off. Along with JP Morgan Chase
and other big banks, Goldman Sachs would then take advantage of the
austerity imposed on Greece and other countries by setting up
infrastructure funds to buy up state-owned assets in fire-sale
privatizations. 117
Unlike the Federal Reserve's lending programs, which have at least
a semblance of statutory guidelines, the Fed has more discretion in its
asset purchase programs, which have provided a longer lasting effort at
trickle-down monetary policy. In the first QE program, which began in
November 2008, the Fed purchased $1.25 trillion in MBS, $300 billion
in Treasury securities, and $200 billion in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
"agency debt," all with money newly created by the Fed.118 The Fed was
no longer just taking distressed mortgage bonds as collateral on loans,
which had been Volcker's concern, it was now actually purchasing more
than a trillion dollars in these assets.
When this QE program ended, the U.S. economy once again slowed.
The financial markets became addicted to the Fed's massive bond
purchases, and when each QE ended the markets needed another fix.119
The Fed responded in November 2010 with QE2 to purchase an
additional $600 billion in Treasury securities. Next came "Operation
Twist" a year later, in which the Fed shifted some of its portfolio of
116. See John Carney, Goldman Sachs Shorted Greek Debt After It Arranged Those
Shady Swaps, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2010, 9:40 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
goldman-sachs-shorted-greek-debt-after-it-arranged-those-shady-swaps-2010-2 ("Despite
its role in creating swaps that may have allowed the Greek government to mask its
growing debts, Goldman has no net exposure to a default on Greek debt.").
117. See Jenny Anderson, Cities Debate Privatizing Public Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/business/27fund.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=O (reporting that Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and the Carlyle Group "are
among the investors who have amassed an estimated $250 billion war chest" to buy up
infrastructure projects in privatization sales); Seumas Milne, The Tide is Turning Against
the Scam that is Privatisation, THE GUARDIAN, July 9, 2014, http://www.theguardian.comI
commentisfree/2014/jul/O9/tide-turning-against privatisation?CMP=sharebtntw; Jerin
Mathew, Goldman Sachs Plans to Launch Infrastructure Fund, INT'L Bus. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2014, 10:56 AM, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/goldman-sachs-plans-launch-infrastructure-
fund-1468357; Michael Nevradakis, Greg Palast: Greece is a Crime Scene, and Vulture
Funds Are to Blame, TRUTHOUT (Jan. 9, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/
item28446-greg-palast-greece-is-a-crime-scene-and-vulture-funds-are-to-blame.
118. LABONTE, supra note 100, at 3 n.6 ("Agency securities and MBS are primarily
issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with some securities issued by the Federal Home
Loan Banks and Ginnie Mae.").
119. Rude, supra note 100, at 607.
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Treasury securities from short-term to long-term maturities, intended to
bring down long-term interest rates on other securities and mortgage
loans. 120 Finally, in September 2012, the Fed announced QE3, an open-
ended pledge to purchase $40 billion of agency MBS and $45 billion of
long-term Treasury securities each month.121 QE3 continued for nearly
two years.
Critics have charged the QE approach with pumping up financial
markets and Wall Street banks, creating new bubbles, ignoring the
needs of real people and Main Street businesses, and weakening the
currencies of countries following the approach, thereby impairing
growth in other nations. 122 After several years and trillions of dollars in
Federal Reserve asset purchases, the U.S. stock market and Manhattan
real estate prices reached new heights, and more than 90 percent of
income gains flowed to the top 1 percent of households. 123 Yet, the Fed's
QE programs became the model for other major central banks.
Beginning in March 2009, the Bank of England purchased about $569
billion in assets, in at least three rounds, increasing the total each time
the effect of the previous round wore off.124 As the Fed was tapering off
its QE3 purchases, the Bank of Japan launched its own QE program of
$1.4 trillion in asset purchases. 125 More recently, the ECB announced its
QE program of $69 billion a month in public and private bond
purchases, to total more than $1.3 trillion. 26 This soon resulted in its
own kind of austerity by pushing down the value of foreign currencies
120. Id.
121. David Wessel, For Fed, Risks of Goosing Market are Worth It, WALL ST. J., Oct.14,
2010, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704763904575550090298620152
8704763904575550090298620152 (reporting that Quantitative Easing is "when the Fed
turns up its electronic printing presses" and creates money to purchase financial assets).
122. Richard Blackden, Brazil President Dilma Rousseff Blasts Western QE as 'Monetary
Tsunami" THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 10, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/
9196089/Brazil-president-Dilma-Rousseff-blasts-Western-QE-as-monetary-tsunami.html
(criticizing the QE programs for weakening currencies of developed countries, thereby
impairing growth in other nations).
123. Josh Barro, 95% Of Income Gains Since 2009 Went To The Top 1% - Here's What
That Really Means, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2013, 1:20 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
comI95-of-income-gains-since-2009-went-to-the-top-1-heres-what-that-really-means-2013-9.
124. Katie Allen, Quantitative Easing Around the World: Lessons from Japan, UK and
US, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/22/
quantitative-easing-around-the-world-lessons-from-japan-uk-and-us (comparing the UK's
QE program (375 billion pounds, or $569 billion) with Japan's ($1.4 trillion)).
125. Id.
126. David Goodman, Euro Weakens as Draghi Announces Expanded Asset-Purchase
Program, BLOOMBERG Bus., Jan. 22, 2015, 9:55 AM, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2015-01-21/euro-pares-gains-as-ecb-to-propose-50-billion-a-month-in-qe.html (reporting
the size of ECB QE program as being more than $69 billion a month in public and private
bond purchases, totaling $1.3 trillion).
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and strengthening the dollar, thereby weakening U.S. exports and
slowing the already weak U.S. economic recovery.
In helping Wall Street and global capital markets, the Fed stretched
its asset purchasing well beyond its traditional powers. Meanwhile, the
Fed claimed a lack of authority to help Main Street interests, even on a
far lesser scale. For example, some on the right have proposed that the
Fed purchase state and municipal bonds to help finance new
infrastructure like construction and repair of roads and bridges. 12
7
Proposals from the left call for the Fed to pump money into state
infrastructure banks and to purchase student debt to allow
moratoriums on debt repayment while labor markets remain weak.
Others urged the Fed and ECB to make cash transfers directly to
consumers and taxpayers. 28 From both sides of the spectrum came
proposals for mortgage loan modifications, financed either directly by
the Fed or by the Treasury with Fed support. 129 These kinds of QEs for
Main Street, like the Fed's QEs for Wall Street, would incur no costs to
government, would not add to deficits, and would put tax-paying
resources back to work. Such monetary policies would have prodded the
United States and Eurozone away from austerity and perhaps deflation,
and instead pushed them in the direction of a more heterodox and
Keynesian full-employment political economy.
CONCLUSION
Federal Reserve governance and independence is often defended as
a corporatist structure that allows the Fed to draw on the expertise of
bankers and financiers. 130 But the exclusion of all social groups, other
127. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest et al., Op-Ed., Getting More Bang for the Fed's
Buck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, at A25 (discussing proposals relating to the right of the
Federal Reserve to purchase state and municipal bonds).
128. See WERNER, supra note 104, at 273; Mark Blyth & Erik Lonergan, Print Less but
Transfer More: Why Central Banks Should Give Money Directly to the People, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141847/mark-blyth-and.
eric-lonerganprint-less-but-transfer-more. John Muellbauer, a senior fellow at Oxford
University's Institute for New Economic Thinking, has called on the European Central
Bank to print money and give five hundred euros to every person in the Eurozone. Jack
Ewing, Eurozone Takes on Quantitative Easing, and Its Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/business/international/eurozone-takeson-
quantitative-easing-and-its-risks.html.
129. Vernon L. Smith, Vernon Smith: Disequilibrium in the Housing Market,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 23, 2011, 8:00 PM, http://www.newsweek.com/vernon-smith-
disequilibrium-housing-market-66953.
130. Jos6 Gabilondo, Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed's Role as a Market Maker of
Last Resort, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 731, 790 (2013) (discussing the governance structure of
the Federal Reserve).
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than bankers, from Fed governance is quite different from the kind of
corporatism that served the United States so well during the "golden
age" of capitalism from the 1940s to the 1970s, when labor had a seat at
the table to provide a "counterveiling power" to big business and
banking interests. 131 Scholars of corporatism recognize two corporatisms
at opposing ends of the spectrum. At one end, the corporatism of fascist
regimes delegates public power to private sector governments
dominated by elite interests in ways that exclude and often crush labor
organizations. At the opposing end, a social democratic corporatism
includes labor interests in the decision process. 132 By excluding a broad
range of social interests that are often negatively affected by Fed policy
decisions, the regional Feds and the FOMC are far from the social
democratic end of the corporatist spectrum.
The irony is that central bank independence and the austerity that
it promotes has had a devastating effect throughout the Eurozone,
contributing to enormously high levels of unemployment, and thereby
encouraging the growth of fascist parties on the right. In assessing the
Fed's responses to the crisis, Neil Irwin concluded that public pressure
on the Fed was mostly one sided: 'Many conservatives and financial
market commentators assailed the central bank for its easy money
stance, and there was little in the way of a crusade from the left to try to
encourage greater activism by the Fed."133 On the mainstream left, Paul
Krugman suggested more monetary trickle-down throughout 2010, that
the Fed might need even larger QE programs, perhaps as much as $8
trillion to $10 trillion in bond purchases, to engineer a full economic
recovery.13 4 Although Fed purchases of Treasuries and mortgage bonds
proved less than effective, Krugman's solution was to have the central
bank simply purchase a lot more of the same assets.
Bernanke's success came from straddling the intersection between
New Classical and New Keynesian economics. As Alan Blinder points
131. Id. at 791, nn. 420-421.
132. Peter Kriesler & Joseph Halevi, Corporatism in Australia, 1-8, 14-16 (Univ. of
New S. Wales Social Policy Research Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 57, 1995) (exploring a
form of corporatism that delegates public power to the private sector); President
Kennedy's attempt to fashion a wage and price accord for the strategically important steel
industry may be seen as an example of a social democratic corporatism that included the
countervailing powers of business, labor, and government. GIBSON, supra note 9, at 6, 9-
18; Videotape: Kennedy Calls Out the Steel Companies (1962), YoUTUBE (Oct. 12, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v-zWNhWANkqOQ.
133. Neil Irwin, The Depression's Unheeded Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11 /upshot/the-depressions-unheeded-lessons-.html?abt=
0002&abg=0.
134. See Videotape: Paul Krugman's Newest QE2 Fantasy, THE DAILY BAIL (Oct. 13,
2010), http://dailybail.com/home/paul-krugmans-newest-qe2-fantasy-video.html (reproducing
original interview with Krugman).
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out, most American Keynesians, including Bernanke, "have long
believed that expansionary monetary policy is a better way to fight
recessions than expansionary fiscal policy."'13 5 The monetary orthodoxy
continues under Fed chair Janet Yellen, Bernanke's successor who is
supposedly more Keynesian, but it is the New Keynesianism that is all
too comfortable with fiscal austerity and high levels of unemployment.
Keynes suggested that in economics you cannot convict your
opponent of error. He perhaps naively believed that orthodox thinkers
could be convinced based on evidence, the power of persuasion, and the
merits of argument. Krugman described the New Classical repression
within the academy, which marginalizes and punishes those who
question the orthodoxy by withholding jobs and publishing
opportunities in major journals. Unfortunately, much of the same
dynamic occurs in the academy, halls of government, and central
banking among New Keynesians and their own orthodoxies of endless
quantitative easing programs. As seen in Inside Job, the 2010 Academy
Award winning documentary on the financial crisis, even elite scholars
and economists enjoy tremendous "revolving door" benefits by currying
favor with Wall Street interests. 136 Perhaps it is not possible to convince
orthodox economists of the errors in their thinking when high salaries
and elite positions depend on not being convinced. 137 Jurists, legislators,
and legal scholars have largely deferred to economic elites on questions
of central bank independence and austerity policies. But a rigged
governance process inevitably leads to rigged outcomes. The longer
reform of central bank governance is delayed, the longer we will have to
live with trickle down monetary and fiscal policies that contribute to
enormous inequalities in income, wealth, and power.
135. ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 350 (2013). According to Bernanke and other New
Classical economists' view, when expansionary fiscal policy is used, it should take the
form of tax incentives, rather than public works and jobs programs. Id. at 350.
136. INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures 2010).
137. Upton Sinclair made this point long ago: "It is difficult to get a man to understand
something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it." UPTON SINCLAIR, I,
CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND How I GOT LICKED 109 (1994).
